We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
ones because of social pressure and norms that attach honor to the former and shame to the latter (e.g., Dan Batson (1998 ), Richard B. Freeman (1997 ). Charitable and non-profit institutions make ample use of donors' desire to demonstrate their generosity and selflessness (or at least the appearance thereof), with displays ranging from lapel pins and T-shirts to plaques in opera houses or hospitals and buildings named after large contributors. Patricia Funk (2005) finds that the introduction of mail voting in Switzerland, which allowed citizens to vote at a lower cost but simultaneously made unobservable who did their "civic duty" and who did not, failed to raise the aggregate voting rate and actually resulted in a decline in small communes.
The presence of a social signalling motive for giving is also evident in the fact that anonymous donations are both extremely rare -typically, less than 1 percent of the total number 2 -and widely considered to be the most admirable. Conversely, boasting of one's generous contributions is often self-defeating. Codes of honor, whose stringency and scope varies considerably across time and societies, are another example of norms enforced largely through feelings of shame or glory. To understand these mechanisms it is again important to not posit exogenous social constraints, but rather to model the inferences and market conditions involved in sustaining or inhibiting them.
Finally, as much as people care about the opinion others have of them, they care about their own selfimage. In the words of Adam Smith (1759), they make moral decisions by assessing their own conduct through the eyes of an "impartial spectator", an "ideal mate within the breast":
"We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it."
In more contemporary terms, psychologists and sociologists describe people's behavior as being influenced by a strong need to maintain conformity between one's actions, or even feelings, and certain values, longterm goals or identities they seek to uphold. 3 Recent studies confirm the importance of such self-image concerns in explaining prosocial behavior in anonymous settings. 4 A very telling experiment by Jason Dana, Jason Kuang, and Roberto Weber (2003) thus shows that when people are given the opportunity to remain ignorant of how their choices affect others, or of their precise role in the outcome (as with firing squads, which always have one blank bullet), many "altruists" choose not to know and revert to selfish choices.
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To examine this broad array of issues, we develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individuals' degrees of altruism and greed with a concern for social reputation or self-respect. The key property of the model is that agents' pro-or anti-social behavior reflects an endogenous and unobservable mix of three motivations: intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational, which must be inferred from their choices and the context. We obtain four main sets of results.
-Rewards and punishments. The presence of extrinsic incentives spoils the reputational value of good deeds, creating doubt about the extent to which they were performed for the incentives rather than for themselves. This is in line with what psychologists term the "overjustification effect" (e.g., Mark R. Lepper et al. (1973) ), to which we give here a formal content in terms of a signal-extraction problem. 6 Rewards act like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio, or even reverse the sign of the signal, and the resulting crowding out of the reputational (or self-image) motivation to contribute can make aggregate supply downward-sloping over a wide range, with possibly a sharp drop at zero.
-Publicity, praise and shame. A greater prominence and memorability of contributions strengthens the signaling motive and thus generally encourages prosocial behavior. When individuals are heterogeneous in their image concerns, however, it also acts like an increase in the noise-to signal-ratio: good actions become suspected of being motivated by appearances, which limits the effectiveness of policies based on "image rewards" such as public praise and shame. The same concern can lead people to refrain from turning down well predicted by independent assessments of the associated "moral satisfaction". Michèle Lamont (2000) documents the importance attached by her interviewees to the presence or absence of the "caring self" not just in others, but also in themselves. 4 For instance, in an anonymous transportation-related survey of about 1,300 individuals, Olof JohanssonStenman and Peter Martinsson (2003) find that people who are asked which attributes in a car are most important to them systematically put environmental performance near the top and social status near the bottom; but when asked about the true preferences of their neighbors or average compatriots, they give dramatically reversed rankings. Interviews with car dealers show intermediate results. 5 For evidence of self-image management in dictator games, see also J. Keith Murnighan et al. (2001) . 6 It is also consistent with the informal explanation provided by Frey and Jegen (2001) , namely that "An intrinsically motivated person is deprived of the chance of displaying his or her own interest and involvement in an activity when someone else offers a reward, or orders him/her to do it".
any rewards that are offered.
-Social and personal norms. The inferences that can be drawn from a person's actions depend on what others choose to do, creating powerful spillovers that allow multiple norms of behavior to emerge as equilibria. More generally, individuals' decisions will be strategic complements or substitutes, as will legal and social sanctions, depending on whether reputational concerns are (endogenously) dominated by the avoidance of stigma or the pursuit of distinction. The first case occurs when there are relatively few types with low intrinsic altruism and when valid excuses for not contributing are more rare than events that make participation inevitable, or unusually easy. The second case applies in the opposite circumstances.
-Welfare and competition. When setting incentives, sponsors such as charities, non-profits or government agencies will exploit these complementarities or substitutabilities, which respectively increase or decrease the elasticity of the supply curve. Because they do not internalize the reputational spillovers that fall on nonparticipants or on those who contribute through other sponsors, however, their policies will generally be inefficient. Thus, even a monopoly sponsor may offer rewards and "perks" (preferred seating, meetings with famous performers, valuable social networking opportunities, naming rights to a building, stadium or professorial chair, etc.) that are too generous from the point of view of social welfare, and sponsor competition may further aggravate this inefficiency. The socially optimal incentive scheme, by contrast, subtracts from the standard Pigouvian subsidy for public goods provision a "tax" on reputation-seeking, which, per se, is socially wasteful. In the market for prosocial contributions, finally, a form of holier-than-thou competition can also lead sponsors to offer agents opportunities for reputationally motivated sacrifices that will again reduce social welfare, without any increase in the supply of public goods.
While a number of related themes have been examined in the literature, none of the existing models provides a unified account of this broad range of phenomena. Standard models of public goods provision or altruistic behavior, whether based on a concern for others' welfare, a pure joy of giving, or reciprocity,
are not consistent with a (locally) downward-sloping response of prosocial behavior to incentives, nor with people choosing not to know how their actions will affect others and reverting to selfish behavior when such ignorance is feasible. Models of giving as a signal of wealth explain monetary donations but not in-kind prosocial acts such as volunteering, helping, giving blood, etc. (these should instead be avoided, as they signal a low opportunity cost of time), the greater admiration reserved for anonymous contributions, or people's choosing to be modest about their good deeds. Models that postulate a reduced-form crowding out (or in) of intrinsic motivation by incentives do not really explain its source and miss its dependence on the informational environment, such as the observability of actions and rewards or the distribution of preferences in the population. The same is true for models of social norms that assume complementarities in payoffs.
The papers most closely related to the present one take a signaling approach to social interactions, although none share with it the structure of multidimensional uncertainty that is essential to generating overjustification effects and net crowding out. In Bénabou and Tirole (2003) , a potential conflict between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation arises from the fact giving an agent high-powered incentives may convey bad news about the task or his ability. The idea that the principal has private information about these variables applies well to child-rearing, education and empowerment versus monitoring of employees, but not to activities such as contributing to a charitable cause, donating blood, voting, etc. 7 In B. Douglas Bernheim (1994) , individuals take actions designed to signal that their tastes lie close to "the mainstream", leading to conformity in behavior and multiple social norms. When reputation bears on prosocial orientation, however, what is valuable is not to resemble the average but to appear as altruistic as possible. Such is the case in Giacomo Corneo's (1997) signaling model of union membership, with which our analysis of social norms shares some important insights. On the other hand, Corneo's model does not give rise to crowding out, and while Bernheim does not consider the effects of incentives, the similarly unidimensional structure of his model will also lead to a standard upward-sloping response. Jerker Denrell (1998) shows how the presence of monetary or side benefits in some activity can destroy the separating equilibrium that would otherwise obtain. While this again does not lead to crowding out, a principal may obtain higher profits with a zero reward than with a positive one. 8 Closest to our paper is that of Paul Seabright (2002) , where individuals 7 The informed-principal approach to rewards remains applicable when agents know their own type, however, if they care about the principal's perception of it. Thus, in Florian Herold (2004) , strong incentives can signal that the principal does not trust the agent, which is bad news for other aspects of the (multitask) relationship. In Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson (2005) , agents derive utility from the principal's ultimate view of their ability or taste for the activity. Depending on the curvature of this "esteem" function, strong incentives, which signal unfavorable priors, may then damage or enhance the expected return to effort. Whereas all the above papers focus on the ex-ante choice of incentives, Anton Suvorov and Jeroen van de Ven (2005) show that ex-post (discretionary) bonuses may serve to enhance motivation by functioning as a credible feedback mechanism.
8 Funk (2005) shows how a model of voting that incorporates a motive to signal oneself as a "good citizen" can very plausibly account for her empirical findings concerning the Swiss policy change discussed earlier. The phenomenon thus captured is again not an instance of crowding-out, as both the cost of voting and its derive from participating in a "civic activity" both a direct benefit that depends on their private type and a reputation that will make them more desirable partners in a later matching market. Under a sorting condition that makes high types care more about reputation, a "payment discontinuity" arises at zero, in that total participation can be greater when no reward is offered than with a small positive one.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model and an intuitive illustration of the image-spoiling effect of rewards. Section II formally demonstrates the crowding-out phenomenon, as well as a related form of the overjustification effect. Section III deals with social norms and more generally the strategic complementarity or susbtitutability of individual decisions. Section IV examines the possibility for agents to turn down rewards. Section V examines the setting of incentives by public or private sponsors and the welfare effects of competition. Section VI concludes. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
I. The Model

A. Preferences and information
We study the behavior of agents who choose the extent of their participation in some prosocial activity:
contributing to a public good or worthy cause, engaging in a friendly action, refraining from imposing negative externalities on others, etc. Each selects a participation level a from some choice set A ⊂ R that can be discrete (voting, blood donation) or continuous (time or money volunteered, fuel efficiency of car purchased). Choosing a entails a utility cost C(a) and yields a monetary or other material reward ya. The incentive rate y ≷ 0 may reflect a proportional subsidy or tax faced by agents in this economy, or the fact that participation requires a monetary contribution; note also that a subsidy to a is equivalent to a tax or fine on −a. The incentive rate is set by a principal or "sponsor" and, for now, individuals take it as given.
visibility are changed simultaneously and it is the latter that causes participation to fall. 9 Our paper naturally also ties in to the large literature on gifts and donations, such as James Andreoni (1993 ), (2006 ) Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996 ), William Harbaugh (1998 , Andrea Buraschi and Francesca Cornelli (2002) and Prendergast and Lars A. Stole (2001) . Other related papers include Ronit Bodner and Drazen Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004a) on self-signaling, Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2000) on identity, Kjell Arne Brekke, Snorre Kverndokk, and Karine Nyborg (2003) on moral motivation, Maarten Janssen and Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) on rewards and the evolution of social norms, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1995) and Laurie Simon Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) on ostentatious consumptions as signaling devices. Our work is also technically related to a recent literature on signals that convey diverging news about different underlying characteristics (Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo et al. (2004 ), Philipp Sadowski (2004 ), David Austen-Smith and Roland G. Fryer (2005 ).
Denoting by v a and v y an agent's intrinsic valuations for contributing to the social good (discussed further below) and for money (consumption of market goods), participation at level a yields a direct benefit
2 is drawn independently from a continuous distribution with density f (v) and mean (v a ,v y ). Its realization is private information, known to the agent when he acts but not observable by others.
Social signaling. In addition to these direct payoffs, decisions carry reputational costs and benefits, reflecting the judgements and reactions of others -family, friends, colleagues, employers. The value of reputation may be instrumental (making the agent a more attractive match, as in Denrell (1998) , Herbert Gintis et al. (2001) or Seabright (2002) ) or purely affective (social esteem or shame as a hedonic good). For simplicity, we assume that it depends linearly on observers' posterior expectations of the agent's type v, so that the reputational payoff from choosing a, given an incentive rate y, is
The signs of γ a and γ y reflect the idea that people would like to appear as prosocial (public-spirited) and disinterested (not greedy), while the factor x > 0 measures the visibility or salience of their actions:
probability that it will be observed by others, number of people who will hear about it, length of time during which the record will be kept, etc. Defining μ a ≡ xγ a and μ y ≡ xγ y , an agent with preferences v ≡ (v a , v y ) and reputational concerns μ ≡ ¡ μ a , μ y ¢ thus solves
In the basic version of the model, μ is taken to be common to all agents and thus public knowledge. In the full version we also allow for unobserved heterogeneity in image-consciousness, with μ distributed independently of v. Finally, while we shall generally cast the analysis in terms of effortful or time-consuming prosocial actions such as volunteering, voting, etc., it is equally applicable to monetary (e.g., charitable) donations, 10 This payoff is defined net of the constant (1 − x) ¡ γ ava − γ yvy ¢ , which corresponds to the case where a remains unobserved. The restriction to payoffs that are linear in the posterior distribution over v is without much loss of generality, since introducing (monotonic) nonlinear payoffs of the form E [ϕ(v a )|a, y] would be essentially equivalent to redefining the density of v a (see also footnote 35). The more restrictive assumption, which we make for tractability, is that the coefficients in (2) are independent of the agent's type v.
with only a simple relabelling of the variables a (dollars contributed) and y (goods or services used as rewards).
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Self-signaling, identity, and moral sentiments. The model admits an important reinterpretation in terms of self-image. When making a decision affecting others' welfare, an individual will often engage in a selfassessment: "How important is it for me to contribute to the public good? How much do I care about money?
What are my real values? " Later on, however, this information may no longer be perfectly "accessible" in memory -in fact, there will often be strong incentives to recall it in a self-serving way. Actions, by contrast, are much easier to remember than their underlying motives, making it rational to define oneself partly through ones' past choices: "I am the kind of person who behaves in this way". Suppose therefore that the exact feelings or signals underlying the participation decision become inaccessible with some probability proportional to x and that, later on, the agent cares about "what kind of a person he is".
12 If, for simplicity, this utility from self-image is linear in beliefs, with weights γ a and − γ y on perceived social orientation and greediness, the model is formally equivalent to the social-signaling one.
Relation to altruism and public goods. An agent's intrinsic motivation to behave prosocially, v a , can stem from two sources. First, he may care about the overall level of a public good to which his action contributes, such air quality. Let this component of utility be w a (nā/n κ ) , whereā represents the average contribution, n the size of the group and κ ≥ 0 the degree of congestion; w a then measures the intensity of the individual's "pure" altruism. 13 Second, he may experience a "joy of giving" u a (independent of social-or self-esteem
Let a be the dollar amount contributed by an individual with a known utility for income, the concavity of which is represented by −C(a). Each dollar generates one unit of public good and entitles the contributor to y units of gifts, perks and privileges (meeting with performers, gala events, networking, etc.), a "currency" for which he has utility v y . The case where the sponsor offers matching funds instead of perks, i.e. rewards contributors in the same currency, corresponds to v y ≡ v a and μ y ≡ 0. In the discrete specification used in Sections III.A-V (a ∈ {0, 1} and v y ≡ 1), it can also be represented as the sponsor's reducing an agent's monetary cost of providing a unit of public good from c ≡ C(1) to c − y. 12 This may reflect pure feelings of pride or guilt from seeing oneself as generous or selfish (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens (1982) , Botond Köszegi (2000) ), an instrumental value of providing the motivation to undertake and persevere in long-term relationships (e.g. Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000) , Bénabou and Tirole (2002) )), or both. The idea that individuals take their actions as diagnostic of their preferences originated in psychology with Daryl J. Bem (1972) and relates closely to cognitive dissonance theory (Leon Festinger and James Carlsmith (1959) ). While psychologists would generally view people as unable to precisely discern their own motives even at the time they act (responding only to the overall mix), this is formally equivalent to our specification in which preference states become inaccessible after some (possibly very brief) period. The link between imperfect recall and intertemporal self-signaling is analyzed in Bénabou and Tirole (2004a) , while Bodner and Prelec (2003) examine contemporaneous self-signaling in a dual-self model. 13 Since we abstract from decreasing marginal utility over the total supply of public good, it is worth concerns) that makes him value his own contribution to nā more than someone else's.
14 Combining these "pure" and "impure" forms of altruism (Andreoni (1988) ) yields v a = u a + w a /n κ ; in large groups with κ > 0, the second term becomes vanishingly small. The simplest interpretation of our model is thus one with a continuum of agents (so v a = u a ) in which the average contribution generates a public good (κ = 1), which an individual values as w aā . The model applies equally well to finite groups of any size n and value κ, however. All that matters is that there be heterogeneity in the intrinsic propensity to contribute or reciprocate, v a , no matter its source, and that agents value being perceived, or perceiving themselves, as having a high v a. This social (self) esteem benefit, μ a E (v a |a, y) , is perhaps what corresponds best to the idea of a "warm glow" of giving: gaining social approval, feeling good about oneself, etc. The important point, however, is the need to go beyond the standard dichotomy between "pure" and "impure" altruism and distinguish, within the latter, between fixed preferences (u a ) and motives that relate to what a person's behavior says about him or her, which will depend on the informational and economic context, including what others are doing. Finally, note that the action a chosen by agents and giving rise to reputation could be their reaction to someone else's behavior, such as cooperation or defection. The model is thus applicable to reciprocity as well as to unconditional prosocial behavior.
We now turn to the terms in (3) relating to material compensation. That in v y y requires no explanation, except to note that if the individual believes that his receiving y reduces the resources available to the sponsor for supporting other activities he cares about, it will be attenuated by an "eviction effect". 15 Consider next the potential negative reputation attached to "greed" or money-orientation, −μ y E (v y |a, y) . Note first that noting that the standard substitution effect that it would generate (if others give more, I should give less) can never cause equilibrium aggregate supply to be downward-sloping. Note also that, at the cost of some additional complexity, one could make agents care about social welfare (which is then defined as a fixed point) rather than about the level of the public good per se. 14 Such would be the effect of feelings of empathy (emphasized by Batson (1998) ) or reciprocity. Equivalently, the marginal cost of participation may include an individual component equal to −u a . The term u a could also arise from agents' following the Kantian imperative to evaluate their actions as if they would lead everyone to make those same choices (Brekke et al. (2003) ). 15 In experiments on charitable giving (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) ), it is typically emphasized to subjects that any rewards will come from an entirely separate research budget and therefore not reduce the amount actually donated. In the real world, the presence and magnitude of an eviction effect will depend on individuals' beliefs about the level at which the budget constraint binds and how they value the alternative uses of funds. Suppose, for instance, that a charity has a fixed budget and will use any funds left over to hire "professionals" who produce τ units of a per dollar, or some other public good of equivalent value. An individuals' valuation of a reward y for his contribution will now be (v y −τw a /n α )y. This simply amounts to a redefinition of v y , in a way that contributes to making it negatively correlated with v a .
all the paper's results but one (Proposition 3) obtain with μ y ≡ 0 just as well. It is nonetheless natural to allow for such an effect: "greedy" is no compliment, and indeed someone who has a high valuation for money relative to effort and / or public goods is not a very attractive partner in friendship, marriage, hiring to a position of responsibility, electing to office and other situations where it is difficult to always monitor behavior or write complete contracts. Demonstrating a low marginal utility for money v y can also be valuable because it signals high wealth, a motive that figures prominently in the literatures on charitable contributions and on conspicuous consumptions (e.g., Glazer and Conrad (1996) , Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) ).
B. The image-spoiling effect of rewards: basic insights
We begin with an intuitive presentation of some key mechanisms. Consider the first-order condition for an agent's choice of a, assuming a well-behaved decision problem over a continuous choice set. By (3), an individual with type (v, μ) who faces a price y equates
where the last term is his (marginal) reputational return from contributing at level a :
Three important points are apparent from (4). First, observing someone's choice of a reveals the sum of his three motivations to contribute (at the margin): intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational. In general all three vary across people, so that learning about v a or v y corresponds to a signal-extraction problem. Second, a higher incentive rate y reduces the informativeness of actions about v a , while increasing it about v y . Third, heterogeneity in agents' image concerns μ represents an additional source of noise that makes inferences about both v a and v y less reliable, and that is amplified when actions become more visible (higher x).
To gain further insight into the impact of incentives on inferences and behavior, let us now focus on the benchmark case where v a and v y are independent random variables, while μ a and μ y are fixed and will be omitted from the notation. Figure 1 then shows, for any a > 0, how the set of agents who contribute at least a varies with the reward y. This group, which we shall term "high contributors", comprises all agents with Figure 1 : the effects of rewards on the pool of participants so its boundary is a straight line corresponding to (4), along which agents choose exactly a. The same condition applies when the participation decision is discrete, a ∈ {0, 1}, as will be the case in the second half of the paper, provided we denote
Along the boundary, agents are now indifferent between participating and abstaining.
When no reward is offered, y = 0, the separating locus is vertical: an agent's contribution reveals nothing about his v y , but is very informative about his v a . In the continuous case prosocial orientation is learned perfectly, in the discrete case one learns whether it is above or below a known cutoff.
When a reward y > 0 is introduced, the slope of the separating locus becomes −1/y < 0. If we ignore, in a first step, any changes in the inferences embodied in the intercept, the original boundary simply pivots to the left, as shown in Figure 1 (everything works symmetrically for a fine or penalty, y < 0). The set of agents contributing at least a thus expands, as types in the hatched area (A + B) are drawn in. Since this occurs at every level of a, the distribution of contributions shifts up (stochastically), resulting in a higher total supply; this is the standard effect of incentives. In equilibrium, however, there are two reputational effects:
a) The new members of the high-contributors' club have lower v a 's than the old ones, so they drag down the group's reputation for prosocial orientation. The reputation of the low-contributors' group also declines, however, so in the discrete-choice case the net effect on the reputational incentive to participate can clearly go either way. Similarly, in the continuous case the reputation E (v a |a, y) attached to contributing exactly a declines (as that locus pivots to the left), but so does the reputation attached to contributing exactly a 0 = a − da, where da is small; the effect on the marginal return ∂E (v a |a, y) /∂a is thus generally ambiguous.
b) The new high contributors are "greedy" types (have a v y above the mean), whereas those who still contribute below a after the reward is introduced reveal that they care less about money than average.
This unambiguously reduces the reputational incentive to participate, as is clear in the discrete case. In the continuous case this follows from the fact that, after the rotation, the locus for contributing at a − da lies below that for contributing a.
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If the overall impact of these changes in inferences is negative, r(a, y) < r(a, 0), as drawn in Figure 1 , the reward attracts some new participants (more greedy agents in area B) to contributing a or more, but repels some existing ones (more public-spirited agents in area C). 17 Overall, the number of agents who contribute at least a may increase or decrease, depending on the weights given to B and C by the distribution f (v).
If a net decrease occurs at every a, the distribution of contributions shifts down (stochastically) and total supply actually declines when a reward y > 0 is introduced, starting from a no-reward situation.
II. The overjustification effect and crowding out
We now turn to the formal analysis, establishing three main results. First, we show how the "overjustification effect" discussed by psychologists can be understood as a signal-extraction problem in which rewards amplify the noise, leading observers (or a retrospecting individual) to attribute less of a role to intrinsic motivation in explaining variations in behavior. We then identify the conditions under which monetary incentives crowd out reputational motivation -or, equivalently, legal sanctions undermine social onesresulting in a supply curve that is downward-sloping over a potentially wide range, or exhibits a sharp drop at zero. Finally, we assess the effectiveness of non-material rewards and punishments such as public praise and shame, showing in particular that it is also limited by a form of overjustification effect.
We use here a specification of the model that builds on and extends the familiar normal-learning setup.
Let actions vary continuously over
A = R, with cost C(a) = ka 2 /2. 18 Agents' valuations v ≡ (v a , v y ) are distributed
in the population as
16 This is due to the fact that C 0 (a) − r(a, y) is increasing in a, by the second-order condition for (3). 17 This matches William Upton's (1973) findings that while offering a monetary reward for giving blood predictably brought in new donors, it reduced donations by those who had regularly been giving for free. 18 The case of a general convex function C(a) is treated in Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) . Both here and there, we focus attention on equilibria in which the reputation vector, E (v|a, y) , is differentiable in a.
and at first we continue to focus on the case where everyone has the same reputational concerns, μ ≡ (μ a ,μ y ).We then extend the analysis to the case where μ isalso normally distributed across individuals.
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A. Material rewards
With fixed μ's, the reputational return (5) is constant across agents and equal tō
Thus, by (4), an agent's choice of a reveals his v a + yv y , equal to C 0 (a) −r(a, y). Standard results for normal random variables then yield
where
Intuitively, the posterior assessment of an agent's intrinsic motivation, E (v a |a, y) , is a weighted average of the priorv a and of the marginal cost of his observed contribution, net of the average extrinsic and reputational incentives to contribute at that level.
Finally, substituting (8) into (9)- (10) shows that an equilibrium corresponds to a pair of functions E (v a |a, y) and E (v y |a, y) that solve a system of two linear differential equations.
Proposition 1 Let all agents have the same image concern (μ a ,μ y ). There is a unique (differentiablereputation) equilibrium, in which an agent with preferences (v a , v y ) contributes at the level
where ρ(y) and χ(y) are defined by (11). The reputational returns are ∂E(v a |a, y)/∂a = ρ(y)k and ∂E(v y |a, y)
The effects of extrinsic incentives on inferences and behaviors can now be analyzed. While a higher y increases agents' direct payoff from contributing, v a + v y y, it also tends to reduce the associated signaling value along both dimensions. In the benchmark case of no correlation (σ ay = 0), for instance,
so a higher y acts much like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio θ ≡ σ y /σ a , leading observers who parse out the agent's motives to decrease the weight attributed to social orientation, ρ(y), and increase its counterpart for greediness, χ(y).
20 When σ ay 6 = 0, a positive correlation tends to amplify the decline in ρ(y), a negative one works to weaken or even reverse it. Indeed, the more v a and v y tend to move together, the less observing a high contribution a, or equivalently a high v a + v y y, represents good news about the agent's intrinsic valuation v a ; and the larger is y, the stronger is this "discounting" effect.
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Summing (12) over agents yields the (per capita) aggregate supply of the public goodā(y), whose slope,
reflects both the standard effect of incentives and the crowding out or in of reputational motivation that they induce. Since the general expression (provided in the appendix) is a bit complicated, we focus here on two benchmark cases that make clear the main factors at play. The first one is that of independent values, for which we show that as long as the reputational concern over either prosocial orientation or money-orientation is above some minimum level, there exists a range over which incentives backfire.
Proposition 2 (overjustification and crowding out). Let σ ay = 0 and define θ ≡ σ y /σ a . Incentives are counterproductive,ā 0 (y) < 0, at all levels such that
20 More precisely, yχ(y) = 1 − ρ(y) rises with y everywhere, but the same is true of χ(y) only for |y| ≤ 1/θ. 21 Thus, as the correlation between v a and v y rises from −1 to 0 to 1, the function ρ(y) pivots downwards over the range 0 < y < 1/θ , from 1/(1 − θy) to 1/(1 + θ 2 y 2 ) and then to 1/(1 + θy). As illustrated in Figure 2a , crowding out can occur over a fairly wide range, making all but very large rewards inferior to none. 22 Most interesting are the comparative statics onμ a and the cross-effects between μ a and y, two predictions for which a recent experiment provides a striking match. Studying the willingness of 238 subjects to join a blood-donor program, Carl Mellström and Magnus Johannesson (2005) found that: a) absent monetary rewards, women contributed significantly more than men: 52 percent versus 28 percent; b) introducing a monetary payment (of about $7) caused a moderate, statistically insignificant increase in men's participation rate (to 37 percent), but led to a dramatic collapse in that of women, which fell to 30 percent; c) when subjects had the opportunity to turn over their fee to a (cancer-related) charity, men's participation remained essentially unchanged (33 percent), but that of women went right back to 53 percent.
If one grants that, for easily understood reasons, it is more important for women than for men to be perceived (and think of themselves) as caring and compassionate human beings -that is, if they have a higher μ athen Proposition 2 (or Figure 2a ) predicts both that they will contribute more in the absence of rewards and that they will be the ones most likely to respond negatively to monetary incentives. 23 By the same logic, they will also respond the most to the option of turning down or giving away the reward, which restores to the blood donation its original, unsullied meaning.
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The second case we highlight is that of "small rewards", which is interesting for two reasons. First, some studies find crowding out (ā(y) decreasing) to occur mostly at relatively low levels, and it is sometimes even suggested that the main effect is a discontinuity at zero in subjects' response to incentives (Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) , Gneezy (2003) ). Is there something qualitatively different between "unrewarded" and "rewarded" activities that could cause rational agents to behave in this way? We show that there is, and
22 The values used in Figure 2a arev a = 4, v y = 1, μ y = 0, θ = .2 and μ a ∈ {0, 6.7, 8.3, 10, 12, 14.6}. In Figure  2b they arev a = 3,v y = 1, μ a = μ y = 1 and θ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5}. 23 By contrast, the experimental results described above cannot be explained by what would have been the standard interpretation of condition (a) alone, namely that women are, on average, more prosocial than men (have a higherv a ). 24 This case is analyzed, in a simpler version of the model, in Section IV, where we show that such options or "menus" may not always be so effective. explain when it will matter. The second reason why "small rewards" are of interest is that in real-world situations where time has an opportunity cost, they will actually correspond to substantial values of y.
Proposition 3 (small net incentives and signal-reversal).
(1) Small rewards or punishments are counterproductive,ā 0 (0) < 0, whenever
(2) Letμ y > 0 and assume that v a and v y are uncorrelated, or more generally not too correlated. Then, as σ a /σ y becomes small, the slope of the supply function at y = 0 tends to −∞. (1) and (2) above, respectively.
The first term on the right-hand side of (16) reflects the intuition given earlier about the role of correlation in generating crowding out -or crowding in. Most important is the second term, whose dependence on the noise-to-signal ratio is illustrated in Figure 2b : letting σ ay = 0, for instance, shows that
Thus, in situations where there is much more uncertainty (hence more to learn) about individuals' desire for money than about their motivation for the specific task at hand, even a minimal concern about appearing greedy (a smallμ y > 0) is sufficient to cause a sharply negative response to small incentives and, in the limit, a downward discontinuity in the supply response. This result, moreover, applies whether or not the task has any prosocial dimension (μ a may equal zero), thus also explaining why adverse effects of small rewards have been found both in experiments involving private, puzzle-solving tasks and others involving public-goods provision. The intuition for why "zero is special" is that, at that point, participation switches from being an "unprofitable" to a "profitable" activity and thus comes to be interpreted as a signal of greed rather than disinterestedness. This signal reversal effect, operating specifically around a zero net reward, creates an additional source of crowding out on top of the general signal-jamming effect (decrease in ρ(y) ) that was shown to operate at all levels of y.
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If the empirical validity of this signal reversal was restricted to very small prizes and fines, it would be of somewhat limited interest. The third result, shows, however, that the relevant "tipping point" is not really zero (except in laboratory experiments, where subjects, once there, have no profitable alternative uses of their time) but agents' monetary value of time, which can be quite substantial. This also suggests that existing experiments may not have been focussing on the most relevant scale of costs and benefits, and that future empirical work should involve situations in which opportunity costs are non-trivial and vary across subjects.
B. Image rewards
Public authorities and private sponsors aiming to foster prosocial behavior make heavy use of both public displays and private mementos conveying honor or shame. Nations award medals and honorific titles, charitable organizations send donors pictures of "their" sponsored child, non-profits give bumper stickers and T-shirts with logos, universities award honorary "degrees" to scholars, etc. 26 Conversely, the ancient practice of the pillory has been updated in the form of televised arrests, posting on the internet the names of parents 25 When the two effects are combined it is easy to get supply curves that have a sharp local minimum at y = 0, so that neither offering rewards (up to a point) nor requiring sacrifices raises supply. Note also that whereas the signal-reversal effect (lim σa/σy→0 [ā 0 (0)] = −∞) is a robust and economically intuitive phenomenon, the fact that the amplitude of |ā(y)| near zero also becomes unbounded in the limit is only an artefact of the linearquadratic specification. In Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) , we thus obtain a similar discontinuity inā(y) at y = 0 with bounded actions (a ∈ {0, 1}) and σ a /σ y = 0. 26 Our previous results may also help understand certain common features of the items which charities, public radio or televisions stations, etc., offer in their mass fundraising campaigns. The relevant interpretation of the model here is that in which a is a monetary donation and y a reward rate in terms of "thankyou gifts" (see footnote 11). Equation (13) then shows that in order to minimize the image-spoiling effect and maximize contributions, the items should not only be cheap compared to the donation (low y) but also have little variance in the private value that individuals attach to them (low σ 2 y ). Hence the offering of standardized goods with commercially available substitutes, such as mugs, umbrellas, etc., rather than original or personalized ones. The only dimension in which the items are unique is the logo they bear, which allows the contributor to "automatically" display a token of his generosity by using them (relatively high x). who are delinquent on child support and those of sexual offenders, and publishing in local newspapers the licence plate numbers of cars photographed in areas known for drug trafficking or prostitution. 27 Formally, greater publicity or prominence corresponds to a homothetic increase in (μ a , μ y ). Our model then confirms the above intuitions, but also delivers important caveats. In particular, when agents are heterogeneous in their reputational concerns, giving greater scrutiny to their behavior may not work that well, as good actions come to be suspected of being image-motivated. To analyze these issues we now allow agents' image concerns, like their valuations, to be normally distributed:
with v and μ independent. In the first-order condition (4), the reputational return r(a, y; μ) is now also normal and independent of v (conditionally on a), with meanr(a, y) given by (8) and variance
The signal-extraction formulas (9)-(10) thus remain unchanged, except that the updating coefficients ρ(y) and χ(y) are respectively replaced by ρ(a, y) ≡ σ 2 a + yσ ay σ 2 a + 2yσ ay + y 2 σ 2 y + Ω(a, y) 2 and χ(a, y) ≡
An equilibrium then corresponds again to a pair of functions E (v a |a, y) and E (v y |a, y) that solve the differential equations (9)- (10), but this system is now nonlinear, due to the term Ω(a, y) 2 in ρ and χ. We are able to solve it for the intuitive and important class of solutions where Ω is independent of a, so that reputations remain linear in a. We cannot a priori exclude the existence of other, nonlinear, equilibria.
Proposition 4 (1) A linear-reputation equilibrium corresponds to a fixed-point Ω(y), solution to:
27 Peer groups also play an important role by creating a rehearsal mechanism: if acquaintances all contribute to a cause, one is constantly reminded of one's generosity, or lack thereof. People indeed volunteer more help in response to a direct request to do so, especially when it comes from a friend, a colleague or family (Freeman 1997) , whose opinion of them they naturally care about more than that of strangers.
where ρ(y) and χ(y) are given by (19) with Ω(a, y) ≡ Ω(y). The optimal action chosen by an agent with type
and the marginal reputations are ∂E (v a |a, y) /∂a = ρ(y)k and ∂E (v y |a, y) /∂a = χ(y)k, with a net value of r(y; μ) = (μ a ρ(y) − μ y χ(y))k for the agent.
(2) There always exists such an equilibrium, and if ω ay = 0 it is unique (in the linear-reputation class).
A greater variability of image motives, Ω(y) 2 = V ar (r(y; μ)) , makes individuals' behavior a more noisy measure of their true underlying values (v a , v y ), reducing both ρ(y) and χ(y). This variance is itself endogenous, however, as agents' reputational calculus takes into account how their collective behavior affects observers' signal-extraction-problem. This is reflected in the fixed-point nature of equation (20).
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Proposition 4 now allows us to demonstrate how increased publicity gives rise to an offsetting overjustification effect. Let all the reputational weights μ = (μ a , μ y ) be scaled up by some prominence or memorability factor, x; the material incentive y remains constant. Aggregate supply is then
where the dependence on x indicates that all the covariance terms ¡ ω attached to them) thus has two offsetting effects on the reputational incentive to contribute: a) a direct amplifying effect, the sign of which is that of μ a ρ(y, x) − μ y χ(y, x) for an individual and μ a ρ(y, x) −μ y χ(y, x) on average. For people who are mostly concerned about appearing socially-minded (μ a À μ y ) this increases the incentive to act in a prosocial manner, whereas for those most concerned about not appearing greedy (μ y À μ a ) it has the reverse effect. 29 b) a dampening effect, as reputation becomes less sensitive to the individual's behavior, which observers increasingly ascribe to image-seeking. Formally, the "effective noise" Ω(y, x) increases with x (in any stable equilibrium) and ρ(y, x) and χ(y, x) consequently tend to decrease with it.
28 When ω ay 6 = 0 there could be multiple equilibria, with different degrees of informativeness. Since the general theme of multiplicity is investigated in Section III.A, we do not pursue it here. 29 For y > 0. We are focussing this discussion, for simplicity, on the "natural" case where ρ and χ are both positive, which occurs as long as σ ay is not too negative; see (19). limited effectiveness, even when it is relatively cheap to do. Consider for instance the case where μ y is known (ω y = 0), possibly equal to zero. As x becomes large (more generally, xkω 2 a >> 1), equation (20) yields
The aggregate social benefit from publicityμ a xρ(y, x) thus grows only as x 1/3 , implying that it is optimal to provide only a finite level of x even when it has a constant marginal cost, or even a marginal cost that declines slower than x −2/3 . 30 Policies by parents, teachers, governments and other principals that rely on the "currency " of praise and shame are thus effective up to a point, but eventually self-limiting.
III. Honor, stigma, and social norms
The second main issue we explore is that of social and personal norms. We first show how multiple standards of "acceptable" behavior can arise from the interplay of honor and shame, then examine what characteristics of the "market", such as the distribution of social preferences, the availability of excuses or the observability of action and inaction, facilitate or impede their emergence.
For the remainder of the paper we focus on the case of a binary participation decision, A = {0, 1}, in which the notions of honor and stigma are most sharply apparent. Unless otherwise specified, we also assume that all agents share the same reputational concern μ ≡ (μ a , μ y ) and the same valuation for money, which we normalize to v y ≡ 1. Their prosocial orientation v a , by contrast, is distributed on some interval [v
Indeed, whereas two-dimensional uncertainty is essential to the overjustification and backfiring-incentives effects analyzed earlier, it is not needed for most of the other results. This simplification also removes any potential incentive for agents to "burn money" in order to signal a low v y .
We again denote r(y) ≡ R(1, y) − R(0, y) and let c ≡ C(1) − C(0). Thus, an agent now participates if
To determine this equilibrium threshold of altruism let us define, for any candidate cutoff v a , the conditional means in the upper and lower tails:
The first expression governs the "honor" conferred by participation, which is the difference between M + (v a ) and the unconditional meanv a . The second one governs the "stigma" from abstention, which isv a − M (v a ) .
Since both are nondecreasing functions, the net reputational gain M + (v a ) − M − (v a ) and the marginal agent's total non-monetary return to contributing, 
A. Endogenous social norms
What makes a given behavior socially or morally unacceptable is often the very fact that "it is just not done", meaning that only people whose extreme types make them social outliers would not be dissuaded by the intense shame attached to it. In other places or times different norms or codes of honor prevail, and the fact that "everyone does it" allows the very same behavior to be free of all stigma. Examples include choosing surrender over death, not going to church, not voting, divorce, bankruptcy, unemployment, welfare dependency, minor tax evasion, and conspicuous modes of consumption.
We show here that such interdependencies between agents' choices arise endogenously through the inferences made from observed behaviors, creating the potential for multiple norms of social responsibility.
In particular, no assumption of complementarity in payoffs (e.g., between v a and the average contribution a, representing a form of "reciprocity") or other value of "conformity" is required to explain the common finding that individuals contribute more to public goods when they know that others are also giving more.
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32 Recall also that, in the discussion of Figure 1 , it was argued that the reputation for prosociality of contributors may worsen either more or less than that of non-contributors when the separating locus pivots to the left due to the presence of a reward y > 0. Indeed, for any given value of v y (over which one then integrates), these reputations respectively correspond to M + (v * a − v y y) and M − (v * a − v y y) , whose difference may increase or decrease with y depending on the slope of M + − M − . 33 For instance, James H. Bryan, and M.A. Test (1967) found that motorists were more likely to stop and help The following results, illustrated in Figure 3 , characterize the set of equilibria of the participation game and the associated supply correspondence.
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Proposition 5 (1) When Ψ is increasing, there is a unique equilibrium, with no participation (v *
(2) When Ψ is decreasing, there are three equilibria for all y ∈ (c a −Ψ(v 
there is again a unique, corner equilibrium.
(3) When Ψ is non-monotonic, there exists a range of values of y for which there are at least two stable equilibria, of which one at least is interior.
When v a is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] , for instance, Ψ(v a ) = v a + μ a /2 so the supply curve is a standard upward-sloping one, as in Figure 3a . When v a has density g (v a ) = 2v a on [0, 1], by contrast,
is decreasing for all μ a > 6, resulting in three equilibria, as in Figure 3b .
For μ a ∈ (3/2, 6), Ψ is hump-shaped, making the higher-participation equilibrium interior.
someone with a flat tire, and walkers-by more likely to put money into a Salvation Army kettle, when they had observed earlier someone else (a confederate) doing so a few minutes before. See also Jan Potters, Martin Sefton and Lise Vesterlund (2001) on charities' frequent strategy of publicly announcing "leadership" contributions and the higher yields achieved when donors act sequentially rather than simultaneously. 34 To pin down off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs when there is full participation, we make the standard assumption that the support of beliefs is weakly increasing in the level of contribution off the equilibrium path, as is necessarily the case is on the equilibrium path: if a > a 0 and v + (a 0 ) and v − (a) denote the sup and the inf of the two supports, respectively, then:
The intuition for the results is that agents' actions will (endogenously) be strategic complements or substitutes, depending on whether it is stigma or honor that is most responsive to the extent of participation. This same condition turns out to play a key role in other issues, such as the socially optimal level of incentives (see Section V.A) and the disclosure or confidentiality of rewards (see Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) ).
Definition 1 Participation decisions exhibit strategic complementarities if
When ∆ 0 < 0, a wider participation (dv a < 0) worsens the pool of abstainers more than that of contributors, so that the stigma from abstentionv a − M − (v a ) rises faster than the honor from participation contribute. This further increases participation and confines abstention to an even worse pool, etc., leading to corner solutions as the only stable equilibria, as in Figure 3b . When ∆ 0 ∈ (−1, 0), complementarity is weak enough that the marginal agents still prefer to stay out, hence stability obtains. This is a fortiori the case when there is susbtitutability, ∆ 0 > 0.
Equipped with this general intuition, we now investigate the main factors that make strategic complementarity -and thus the existence of multiple social norms-more or less likely.
Distribution of social preferences. One expects that stigma considerations will be dominant when the population includes only a few "bad apples" with very low intrinsic values, which most agents will be eager to differentiate themselves from. Formally, an increasing density g(v a ) makes it more likely that
the weight reallocated at the margin is small relative to that in the upper tail, but large relative to that in the lower tail. Conversely, honor will dominate when there are only a few heroic or saintly types, whom the mass of more ordinary individuals would like to be identified with.
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35 Corneo (1997) provides related insights (but formal results only in a quadratic case), based on whether the value of reputation is assumed to be a concave ("conformist") or a convex ("elitist") function of someone's perceived rank (which, by definition, is uniformly distributed) in the distribution of altruism. For any such function s(r a ) of rank r(v a ) ≡ G(v a ), we can defineṽ a ≡ s(r a ) = (s • G)(v a ), which has density Proposition 6 (1) (Jewitt (2004) ) If the distribution of v a has a density that is (a) decreasing, (b) in-
(2) If the distribution of v a has a log-concave density (more generally, a log-concave distribution function), then for all μ a ∈ [0, 1] the supply function is everywhere upward-sloping.
Part (1) provides sufficient conditions for the monotonicity of M + − M − , which defines complementarity or substitutability. What ultimately matters for uniqueness or multiplicity and the slope of the supply curve, on the other hand, is the behavior of
, for which the strength of reputational concerns, μ a , is also relevant. In part (2) we thus show that, for all μ a ∈ [0, 1], uniqueness obtains as long as g does not increase too fast -a much weaker condition than (1b). No simple analogue is available for the case of multiplicity, but it is clear that it corresponds to situations where complementarity obtains and μ a is high enough (as in the example given earlier).
Excuses, forced participation, and observability. We have so far assumed that observers (other agents, future "self") know for sure that the individual had an opportunity to contribute and, if so, whether or not he did. This is often not the case, however.
Suppose that with probability δ ∈ [0, 1], an individual faces (unverifiable) circumstances that preclude participation: not being informed, having to deal with some emergency, etc. For any potential cutoff v a , the honor conveyed by participation is unchanged, M P (v a ) = M + (v a ), while the stigma conveyed by non-participation is lessened, taking the form of a weighted average
The same expressions are easily seen to apply if abstention never gives rise to a signal that the individual contributed, but a contribution may go unnoticed (fail to generate such a signal) with probability δ.
Conversely, suppose that with probability δ 0 ∈ [0, 1] , an individual is forced to contribute, or draws a temporarily low cost c The stigma from abstention is now unchanged, M NP (v a ) = M − (v a ) , but the distinction conveyed by participation is dulled, and given by
. Thus all the results in Proposition 6.1 on increasing, decreasing and unimodal densities immediately carry over to concave, and convex and convex-concave payoff functions.
The same expressions apply if participation always gives rise to a signal suggesting that the individual contributed, but non-participation can go undetected (also lead to such a signal) with probability δ 0 .
Proposition 7 1) An increase in the probability of unobserved forced participation facilitates the emergence of strategic complementarities and multiple social norms, whereas an increase in the probability of (unobserved) involuntary non-participation inhibits it.
2) The same results hold for, respectively, an increase in the probability that abstention may escape detection and for an increase in the probability that a good deed goes unnoticed.
Empirical and policy implications. The results of this section have a number of interesting implications.
First, for behaviors such as crime, from which most people are deterred by either a strong intrinsic distaste (the density of v a is increasing) or strong extrinsic constraints (a high δ 0 ), stigma-avoidance will be the dominant reputational concern (by contrast, having no criminal record is not particularly glorious) and actions will be strategic complements, potentially leading to substantial variations over time and space.
Conversely, opportunities to engage in heroic behaviors (risking one's life for someone else, donating an organ or significant wealth) are relatively rare (high δ) and few people are intrinsically motivated to such great feats of abnegation. The signaling motive will therefore be dominated here by the pursuit of distinction, making noble acts strategic substitutes and their prevalence much less variable than that of (comparably rare, on average) criminal acts.
Second, even absent multiplicity, the two types of behaviors will respond quite differently to public intervention. Sinceā
we see that for crime-like behaviors the effect of legal rewards and punishments (y) is amplified by the response of social pressure (crowding in), whereas for self-sacrifices it is dampened by it (partial crowding out). We shall come back to this point when analyzing the socially optimal level of incentives.
IV. Turning down rewards
An agent may be eager to engage in a prosocial action, but concerned that the value of his good deed will be sullied by an inference that material considerations played a role in the decision. In some situations, he may then want to turn down part or all of the reward (provided the incentive scheme is indeed a payment for good behavior rather than a penalty for bad behavior), or even supplement his participation with a net monetary contribution. 36 Naturally, the issue does not arise if give-backs are not observable by the audience to whom agents are trying to signal, or if the sponsor can reward them secretly. On the other hand, taking secret rewards does not help with self-image and may even damage it.
Suppose now that the realized transfer from the sponsor to the agent is effectively observable. When the uncertainty is only about v a , the net reputational gain from participating for y 0 ≤ y, relative to not participating, is r(
The agent therefore cannot signal his type by taking less than y or even giving money to the sponsor: the loss of income, v y (y − y 0 ), and the net reputational benefit, r(y 0 ) − r(y), are both type-independent. Consequently, the equilibria studied in Section III (where v y ≡ 1) are still equilibria of the enlarged game in which agents can turn down part or all of the reward.
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For the same reason, offering menus of rewards cannot benefit the sponsor.
By contrast, when the uncertainty is (also) about v y , which is needed to obtain net crowding-out, turning down the reward or part of it could be used to signal the absence of greed. The idea that offering such "menus" may be a good strategy for increasing contributions (as in the blood-donation experiment discussed earlier) is consistent with both our information-based approach to prosocial behavior, which emphasizes individuals' concerns with the inferences attached to their contributions, and with the general principle that a principal always (weakly) benefits from being able to screen agents along more dimensions.
Yet, even in this case, it may be that all agents either just accept y or do not participate, but never turn down rewards, so that there is no gain to introducing the option. The intuition is that doing so could lead the audience to question an agent's motivation along another dimension: is he genuinely disinterested, or merely concerned about appearances? It is thus linked to the general idea that good deeds that are "too 36 Alternatively, sponsors may respond to contributors' desire to appear intrinsically rather than extrinsically motivated by publicly announcing low rewards. In Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) we show that: a) with strategic substitutes (∆ 0 > 0), a sponsor would indeed like to do so, but this creates a commitment problem: if it can later on secretly renegotiate with the agents, both will agree to raising y; b) with strategic complements (−1 < ∆ 0 < 0) , on the contrary, the sponsor offers a higher fee under public disclosure than under confidentiality and this is renegociation-proof since agents will not agree to secret cuts in their rewards. 37 It can also be verified that these equilibria satisfy the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response criterion of In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps (1987) . obvious" may backfire, which was first encountered when studying public prominence in Section II.B.
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To capture this idea, we allow again uncertainty about v = (v a , v y ) to combine with uncertainty about agents' degree of image-consciousness μ = (μ a , μ y ) but focus here on a very simple case, to avoid what would otherwise be a rather technical analysis. Suppose that (μ a , μ y ) = (xγ a ,xγ y ), where (γ a , γ y ) is fixed and thus known to the audience, whereasx is independently distributed from (v a , v y ) and takes one of two extreme values: agents are either image indifferent (x = 0) or image driven (x = +∞). Image-indifferent individuals participate if and only if v a − c + v y y ≥ 0; when they do, they clearly never turn down the reward (or part of it), as this would be a strictly dominated strategy. We shall assume that if the population consisted only of image-indifferent individuals, participation would be reputation-enhancing (E(γ a v a −γ y v y | v a +v y y ≥ c) > 0, which always holds for y below some threshold). Turning now to image-driven individuals, they all pool on the actions that yield the highest reputation, choosing an a ∈ {0, 1} and a reward y 0 ≤ y that maximize
. If, in equilibrium, a positive fraction of them chose to participate and receive y 0 < y, they would be identified as image-driven types, and so their reputation would correspond to the prior mean (v a ,v y ). 39 But they would then be strictly better off pooling with those image-indifferent agents who participate at price y. The unique equilibrium thus consists in participation, at the offered price y, by all image-driven individuals and by those image-indifferent individuals for whom v a − c + v y y ≥ 0.
Proposition 8 Agents may never turn down the reward, or part of it, even when this would be publicly observed and there is uncertainty about money-orientation, v y .
It is worth pointing out that in deriving this result, we did not assume any social opprobrium on imageconsciousness; presumably, this would only reinforce agents' reluctance to turn down rewards.
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38 The same intuition implies that people may want to be "modest" about their generosity. Thus one can show, in a simple extension of the model (with again heterogeneity in μ a ), that agents may refrain from disclosing their good deeds, hoping that the audience will come to learn of them through other channels. 39 If they pooled at multiple values y
V. Welfare and Competition
We now examine the way in which public or private sponsors (social planner, government agency, NGO, religious organization, etc.) will set incentives and the welfare properties of the resulting equilibrium. For these purposes, we first need to make explicit again the public-good aspects of agents' contributions, then specify different sponsors' objective functions.
Recall from Section I.A that an individual's intrinsic motivation can, in general, have two components:
κ , where u a is a pure "joy of giving" whereas w a is the marginal utility of a public good nā/n κ generated by total contributions nā. To simplify the analysis, we take here u a and w a to be independently distributed (with again v y ≡ 1) and denote the mean of w a asw a .
Given an incentive rate y, an equilibrium (unique or not) is determined by a cutoff v * a . Agents' expected per capita welfare is thus
This expression embodies three effects. First, each agent who contributes enjoys a direct utility v a − c + y and additionally generates for the n − 1 others a positive spillover, equal tow a /n κ on average. Second, the pursuit of esteem is a zero-sum game: the average reputation in society remains fixed at μ a v a , reflecting the martingale property of beliefs. 41 Third, because an agent's participation decision is based on the private reputational return rather the social one (which is zero), it inflicts an externality onto others. Thus, starting from equilibrium, the welfare impact of a marginal increase in participation is
The first term is the standard public-goods externality, which we shall denoteē ≡ (n − 1) (w a /n κ ). The second term reflects the fact that each marginal participant brings down the "quality" of the pool of contributors as well as that of non-contributors: by the martingale property, the reputational losses of inframarginal agents on both sides must add up to the gains of the marginal participant, ∆(v * a ) = r(y). Equivalently, we can think of (31) as the difference between a free-riding effect and a reputation-stealing effect.
A. Sponsors' choice of incentives and the social optimum
Consider now a public or private sponsor that internalizes some fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of agents' welfare and also derives from each one's participation a private benefit with equivalent monetary value B. We focus first on the case of monopoly or differentiated public goods, then consider competition. The sponsor's expected payoff (normalized by population size n) is thus
For a social planner whose preferences mirror the ex-ante utility of the n potential contributors and who has access to lump-sum taxes, α = 1 and B = 0. More generally, B ≥ 0 could reflect a different discounting of the welfare of future generations (e.g., with pollution or biodiversity) and α ≤ 1 the presence of a shadow cost of public funds: clearly, replacing B − y by B − (1 + λ)y in π(y) is equivalent to dividing both B and α in (32) by 1 + λ. For other actors such as charities, NGO's or specialized government agencies, B may reflect the premium placed on a public good by a particularly motivated constituency (friends of the arts, environmentalists), or some purely private benefits tied to the channeling of donations or the delivery of public goods: rents appropriated in the process by the organization, bundling of a religious message with schooling or poverty relief, or (in reduced form) the sponsor's own signaling or career concerns.
42 Both B and the weight α placed by the sponsor on social welfare are again normalized by the opportunity cost of funds that it faces.
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Since rewards that lead to net crowding out,ā 0 (y) < 0, are never optimal, we assume that Ψ 0 > 0, resulting in a unique equilibrium v * a (y) which, for simplicity, we take to be interior, and a supply curve nā(y) = 42 Sponsors often also care about the quality of participation, not just total enrollment, in cases were it is subject to adverse selection or moral hazard. Thus, one argument for relatively low pay for the military is to select true patriots rather than mercenaries whose main loyalty is to whoever pays more. Similarly, it is often argued that not paying for blood reduces the fraction of donors with hepatitis and other diseases. These ideas could be captured by introducing a hidden action (beyond a ∈ A, which is observed) whose marginal cost to the individual decreases with v a , leading to a benefit for the sponsor B (v a ) , with B 0 > 0. For instance, a purely private sponsor (α = 0) would now maximize E v,μ [(B (v a ) − y) a(v, μ; y)] . 43 It is worth recalling here that the model also applies to monetary donations, with sponsors offering either a matching rate or "perks" and other goods or services (in addition to the publicity); see footnote 11.
, with elasticity ε(y) ≡ yā 0 (y)/ā(y) > 0. We also assume thatW is strictly quasiconcave in all cases (it always is for α = 1). Using (31) and noting thatā
For (symmetric) competitive sponsors, the private-payoff term in (32) is replaced by (B − y i )ā i (y), wherē a i (y) is the share of total contributions specifically channeled through sponsor i; in equilibrium, all rewards are then driven to B.
44 We shall denote the values of α, B, y andW for the social planner, monopolistic and competitive sponsors by the superscripts s, m and c respectively, with α s > max {α m , α c } .
Proposition 9 1) The socially optimal incentive rate is always strictly less than the standard Pigouvian subsidy y P ≡ē + B s that leads agents to internalize the full public-good value of their contribution. When taxation is non-distortionary (α s = 1) it equals y s = y P − ∆(c − y P ), and more generally is given by The first result shows that the optimal incentive scheme should include a tax that corrects for the reputation-seeking motive to contribute, which in itself is socially wasteful. This reputational rent is endogenous to the reward, however. Thus with α s = 1, when individual contributions are complements (respectively, substitutes) y s = y P − ∆(c − y P ) responds less (respectively, more) than y P to changes in B s (which leave the function ∆ unchanged). Similarly, the optimal penalty for antisocial activities such as littering, polluting, etc., should "leave space" for the effect of opprobrium, which itself depends on the 44 While this is the standard result, it depends here crucially on the fact that v y = 1 is known. Otherwise, there is a reputational payoff to participating for a lower fee and sponsor competition will then lead to rewards being bid down rather than up, leaving firms with positive profits. This "reversal" of Bertrand competition is analyzed in Bénabou and Tirole (2004b) and shares important similarities with Bagwell and Bernheim's (1996) analysis of the pricing of conspicuous-consumption goods.
fine. As to a higher shadow cost of public funds (a proportional reduction in α s and B s ), it naturally tends to reduce y s ; when contributions are substitutes, some of this reduced public intervention is made up by increased social pressure, as ∆ rises in response to the decline in participation. With complements, however, the reputational incentive to contribute is also weakened. These results provide both some support and an important qualification to arguments (e.g. Geoffrey Brennan and Philipp Pettit (2004) ) calling for a shift in public policy from the use of fines and other costly sentences to a greater reliance on public praise and shame. Esteem-based incentives can adequately replace material rewards and punishments in spheres where gaining distinction is the dominant reputational concern (self-sacrifice, heroism, great inventions), but not in those where avoiding stigma is most important (crime, welfare dependency).
The intuition for the second result in Proposition 9 is that a monopolist setting y m does not not internalize the reputational losses of inframarginal agents to the same extent as a planner would. This gives it an incentive to attract too many "customers", which works against the standard monopolistic tendency to serve too few. The tension between these two forces can be seen from the fact that
A low supply elasticity ε causes the monopolist to offer too low a price, as usual. When reputational concerns are important enough, however (a high μ a and therefore a high ∆), the informational externality can dominate, making the monopolist too "generous" or not demanding enough in the standards it sets for monetary donations. The last two terms in (35), finally, represent the the total benefits (private benefit plus internalized contribution to social welfare) derived by each sponsor from a marginal agent's participation, each normalized by the corresponding shadow cost of funds. The effect of their difference on the sign of y m − y s is straightforward, and Part (2) of the proposition normalizes it to zero as a benchmark.
Sponsor competition, finally, further exacerbates the above inefficiency, because each firm now has a much higher incentive to raise its offer than a monopolist (it takes the whole market), but still inflicts the same reputational cost on all inframarginal non-contributors. This suggests, for instance, that universities may sell the naming rights to professorial chairs and buildings too cheaply, relative to the social optimum.
B. Holier-than-thou competition
We saw that competition may reduce welfare by inducing excessive participation in prosocial activities that generate only moderate public-good benefits but have a high visibility. We will now see that it can reduce welfare (relative to a monopolist) even without any change in participation, by leading sponsors to screen contributors in inefficient ways. This result formalizes in particular the idea of religions and sects competing on orthodoxy, asceticism and other costly requirements for membership (e.g., Eli Berman (2000)). Another important example is that of charities sponsoring events where agents, instead of simply donating or raising money (or on top of it), engage time-intensive, strenuous activities such as a day-long walk, marathon or other tests of endurance often requiring months of preparation.
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To capture this phenomenon most simply, let v a take values v is c (possibly zero) unless the sponsor demands a "sacrifice", which it is able to verify and publicly certify.
The cost then becomes c H for the high type and c L for the low type, where
A sacrifice is a pure deadweight loss, whose only benefit is to help screen agents' motivation. The assumption that c L > c H reflects the idea that such a sacrifice is less costly to a more motivated agent. For simplicity, we will assume that c L is so large that the low type is never willing to sacrifice and will focus on deterministic contracts offered by sponsors who seeking to maximize their private payoff π(y); that is, we set α = 0 (the results would extend to any α < 1).
Proposition 10 In the two-type case described above, a monopoly sponsor who wants both types to contribute does not screen contributors inefficiently. By contrast, competing sponsors may require high-valuation individuals to make costly sacrifices that represent pure deadweight losses, thereby reducing social welfare.
The intuition for this result is that non-price screening imposes a negative externality on low-type agents, 45 Camille Sweeny (2005) documents that: (a) many large, health-related charities in the United States now derive over a third of their revenues from endurance programs and challenges; b) most sponsored participants are not athletic types or even regular exercisers (leading to a high rate of injury); c) while their motivations vary, the fundraising / doing-good aspect is the dominant one (they often have themselves been, or are personally close to, victims of the disease which the funds they are raising will be dedicated to combat).
the cost of which a monopolist must fully bear but which competitive sponsors do not internalize. Indeed, screening through costly sacrifices has two effects: a) it inflicts a deadweight loss c H − c on the high type, which the sponsor must somehow pay for; b) it boosts the high type's reputation and lowers that of the low type. When the high-type's reputational gain exceeds the cost of sacrifice, the sponsor through which he contributes can appropriate the surplus, in the form of a lower reward. If this sponsor is a monopolist who finds it profitable to serve the whole market (which is always the case when ρ is low enough), he must also compensate the low type for his reputational loss. By a now familiar argument, these losses must exactly offset the high type's reputation gains, so the net effect of (b) on agents' average utility, as well as on the monopolist's payoff, is nil. This leaves only the net cost corresponding to (a), implying that a sponsor serving the whole market will never require sacrifices.
Things are quite different under free entry. First, since v y is known, price competition again drives all sponsors to offer B. Second, by requiring a sacrifice, entrants can now attract the high types away from competitors who impose no such requirement, leaving low-types (or their sponsors) with the resulting reputational loss. This "cream-skimming" leads inevitably to an equilibrium where a proportion ρ of the contracts offered by active sponsors require an inefficient sacrifice and attract only high-types, while the remaining 1 − ρ require only the normal contribution c and attract the low types.
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Turning finally to welfare, one can show that both types of agents are better off under competition than under monopoly (see the appendix). The sponsors or their underlying beneficiaries, however, must necessarily lose more than all contributors gain: total participation remains unchanged (both types still contribute), the same is true of average reputation (by the martingale property), and rewards are pure transfers. There is now, however, a deadweight loss of ρ(c H − c), corresponding to the wasteful sacrifices made by the high-types to separate. Therefore, competition unambiguously reduces welfare.
VI. Conclusion
To gain a better understanding of prosocial behavior we sought, paraphrasing Adam Smith, to "thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influence it". People's actions indeed reflect a variable mix of altruistic motivation, material self-interest and social or self image concerns. Moreover, this mix varies across 46 As long as ρ is not too large, this is the only equilibrium that is robust to the Cho-Kreps (1987) criterion.
an individual judging himself in retrospect) with a signal-extraction problem. Crucially, altering any of the three components of motivation, for instance through the use of extrinsic incentives or a greater publicity given to actions, changes the meaning attached to prosocial (or antisocial) behavior and hence feeds back onto the reputational incentive to engage in it.
This simple mechanism lead to many new insights concerning individuals' contributions to public goods, the interactions between formal incentives and social norms, and the strategic decisions of public or private sponsors seeking to increase or capture contributions. This line of research could be extended in several interesting directions. A first one concerns organizations, where high-powered incentives or performance pay could conflict with agents' signaling motives that arise from teamwork or career concerns. A second relates to the role and objectives of sponsors, who in practice often have their own signaling concerns. A third one, linked to the self-image interpretation of the model, is to the topic of identity and the many instances where people refuse transactions that seem to be in their best economic interest, but which they judge to be insulting to their dignity.
.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since y is here a fixed parameter, in what follows we will temporarily omit from the notation the dependence of all functions on this argument. Differentiating (9)- (10) Since Z(Ω 2 ) is always positive but tends to zero as Ω 2 becomes large, there is always at least one solution.
When ω ay = 0, moreover, Z(Ω 2 ) is the sum of two squared terms that are decreasing in Ω 2 , so the solution is unique. When ω ay 6 = 0, one cannot rule out multiple equilibria; note, however, that those that are stable (in a standard, tâtonnement sense) are those where Z cuts the diagonal from above. Therefore, in any stable
equilibrium Ω is increasing in k, which in turn implies that ρ(y) and χ(y) are decreasing in k, as long as σ ay is not too negative. Finally, multiplying all the ¡ μ a , μ y ¢ 's by a common "publicity factor" x has the same effect on (A.5) as multiplying k 2 by x, which concludes the proof. ¥ Proof of Proposition 6: Part (1) is due to Jewitt (2004) . To show Part (2), we can write:
then observe that both M + and M − are increasing functions, and so is v a −M − (v a ) = ³ R va
if the integral of G is log-concave. Since log-concavity is preserved by integration over convex sets, it suffices that G itself be log-concave. In turn, a sufficient condition for this is that g be log-concave. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7:
To show (1), rewrite
and observe that if (M P − M NP ) 0 (v a ; δ) > 0, this expression is also positive for all δ 0 > δ, since
and the last term is clearly decreasing in v a . Similarly, to show (2) note that in this case (1) As long as ρ is not too small, it is optimal for the monopolist to get both types on board. If he does not demand any sacrifice, he sets y so as to make the low type indifferent:: 
